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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-oooOooo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CORINNE SKIDMORE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20000719-CA 
Priority No. 2 
This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to grant a 76-3-402 reduction 
from a first degree conviction to a second degree conviction after making the necessary 
findings sufficient to warrant such a reduction. Such a refusal was an abuse of 
discretion. The trial judge agreed with counsel, but then denied the motion anyway. 
Also, Ms. Skidmore raises the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
for the first time on appeal. Robert Breeze, former counsel, rendered a deficient 
performance which fell well below the standards of reasonable professional judgment 
causing substantial prejudice to Ms. Skidmore. He had Ms. Skidmore plead Guilty to 
the First Degree Felony as charged rather than to force the State to try its allegations 
before a jury. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). Ms. Skidmore appeals 
the final order and judgment of the Honorable Tom L. Willmore of the First Judicial 
District Court, in and for Cache County involving a conviction of Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance within a 1000' of a school, a First Degree Felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in deferring the 76-3-
402 Reduction to the Board of Pardons even though he apparently agreed that a 
reduction would be appropriate. 
2. Whether Ms. Skidmore received ineffective assistance of counsel by Mr. 
Robert Breeze, Attorney at Law. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. 402 Motion Denial. This Court should reverse the conviction in this 
matter. In the alternative, it should find that the trial court abused its discretion of 
deferring the 76-3-402 decision to the Board of Pardons, and remand with instructions. 
2 
Ms. Skidmore presented her 402 Motion to Judge Willmore not the Board of Pardons. 
Judge WillmoTe should have granted Ms. Skidmore a sentence reduction pursuant to 
76-3-402; 76-3-402 does not instruct the board to grant the reduction. Once the judge 
agreed that her prison sentence would be unduly harsh under the circumstances a 
reduction is statutorily entitled to her. 
[W]e review the trial court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard 
and its "conclusions based on the totality of those facts for correctness." State v. 
Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). A question of statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, P16, 4 P.3d 100; State v. Westerman, 945 
P.2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 14 P.3d 698 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Because the application of a statute is a question of law, the appellate court must 
review for correctness the actions of the trial court. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 
1161, 1164 (UtahCt. App. 1997). 
State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
(2) Ineffective Assistance. This Court should review Ms. Skidmore's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel even though raised first time on appeal by her 
new counsel, D. Bruce Oliver. 
The Because new counsel represents Maestas in this appeal and because we 
believe the record is adequate to review his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal, we will review those claims as a matter of law. See 
State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
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[Included herewith in Addendum A.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgment of Judge Willmore, 
of the First District Court. On July 25, 2000, the trial court sentenced Ms. Skidmore 
for Distribution of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine), a First Degree Felony 
in violation of 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), imposing a five year to life commitment. (R. at 42-43, 
69). 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
This matter commenced on March 20, 2000 by Information. The 
Information claimed that on or about March 7, 2000, Ms. Skidmore "did knowingly 
and intentionally distribute Methamphetamine, a controlled or counterfeit substance, or 
agreed, consented, offered, or arranged to distribute a controlled substance or 
counterfeit substance, and committed the offense, within a 1000' of a school." (R. at 
14-15, 20-21). On that same date, Robert Breeze, Attorney at Law, entered his 
appearance as counsel for Ms. Skidmore. (R. at 11-12). Also at that time, Ms. 
Skidmore appeared before the trial court and requested a Preliminary Hearing, (r. at 
13), obviously contesting the charge. However, on June 15, 2000, with Mr. Breeze's 
representation, Ms. Skidmore entered a change of plea to Guilty to First Degree 
Distribution, just as charged without conditions or recommendations. (R. at 70). 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
No trial was conducted in this matter. This matter was disposed of by 
stipulation between the parties. Ms. Skidmore pled Guilty to a First Degree Felony 
Distribution, even though the quantity she was found with on March 7, 2000, was 
arguably of personal use. The plea was not taken pursuant to Rule 11 an error by trial 
counsel. Recommendations were not stipulated to and offered to the judge for 
acceptance.1 
IV. Statement of Facts: 
In this matter, Ms. Skidmore entered a Guilty Plea on June 15, 2000 after 
first waiving her right to a Preliminary Hearing on May 19, 2000. (R. at 22-23). Ms. 
Skidmore pled Guilty to the First Degree Felony as charged with by the State from the 
inception. Judge Willmore was surprised exclaiming, "To a first degree felony?" (R. 
at 70, 1 2). Nevertheless the judge accepted the plea. (R. at 70, 1 7). 
The exchange between the court and Mr. Breeze is as follows: 
THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Breeze, Mr. Ward. This is the time set 
for a pretrial conference. Have you been able to resolve it? 
MR. BREEZE: Your Honor, they've made a plea offer that we're willing to 
accept. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BREEZE: So we're prepared to enter a plea at this time. It would be a 
plea as charged. 
THE COURT: To a first degree felony? 
1
 To do so would have been sound professional judgment that would not have 
prejudiced his client. 
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MR. BREEZE: That's correct, Your Honor. 
Then Ms. Skidmore underwent a Presentence Investigation wherein she 
fully cooperated and disclosed everything to the investigator, both admitting her 
addiction and distribution. (R. at 68 11 4-5, 8, 12). The report was prepared and filed 
into the court's record on July 15, 2000. (R. at 69 1 2). At the time of sentencing, Mr. 
Breeze argued the Defendant's Motion to Sentence as Second Degree Felony Pursuant 
to 76-3-402 U.C.A. (hereinafter the "Defendant's Motion) seeking the one-step 
reduction of the offense from a First Degree Felony to a Second Degree Felony. 
Regarding the Defendant's Motion, Mr. Breeze argued adversely to his 
client, "Your Honor, I'm not telling you anything you don't already know when I say 
that the plague of methamphetamine is just a scourge on society. Everybody who is 
involved in the court system sees the damage that this drug does, the power of this drug 
to destroy lives." (R. at 69 1 3). Then, Mr. Breeze continued, informing the court that 
the drugs makes it's way from China to the United States through labs in Mexico. He 
refers to methamphetamine as an "insidious, diabolical, Satanic drug." (R. at 69 1 4). 
Afterwards, Mr. Breeze does offer insight to the judge regarding Ms. Skidmore. He 
characterizes Ms. Skidmore as "just a very common, ordinary country person who, 
with the exception of a trip to Disneyland or California when she was a child, has 
really never traveled more than a hundred miles from her home." (R. at 69 1 4-5). He 
then informs the court that Ms. Skidmore was "just a very basic human being who fell 
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prey to this insidious evil drug," (id. at 1 5), and that her life quickly went downhill 
because of her use of that drug. Thereafter, Mr. Breeze introduced the judge to Ms. 
Skidmore's two adult daughters showing the court that Ms. Skidmore did have strong 
family support. (R. at 69 1 5). 
At that point Mr. Breeze address mitigating factors dealing with the 
Defendant's Motion. Mr. Breeze addresses the Bear River Mental Health letter and 
addresses her successful counseling and submission of clean urinalyses. (R. at 69 1 5-
6). The court and counsel discuss that there had been eleven tests and they all had been 
negative. (Id. at 1 6). Mr. Breeze then argues that previously Ms. Skidmore looked 
like "walking death" and that he's amazed at the "inner strength" of his client for being 
able to go forward abstaining from use and for voluntary treatment. (At t 6). 
Finally, Mr. Breeze wraps up his oral arguments brushing the following: 
(1) Ms. Skidmore is amenable to supervision, (2) she has done well in treatment, (3) 
she has a minor son, (4) she is not a sophisticated criminal, (5) she made full disclosure 
with the presentence investigator, and (6) her parents were killed in 1995 in an 
automobile accident. 
At that point, Mr. Breeze had other family members speak. First was 
Ms. Skidmore's sister, Cosette Reese. The judge indicated that he had read her letter. 
(R. at 69 if 7). With that, Ms. Reese only stated that Ms. Skidmore is a "really good 
person. Very loving, unselfish." Then her brother Victor spoke, likewise offering 
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very little other than his observations of Ms. Skidmore's improvements since quitting 
her use of meth. (R. at 69 1 8). 
Thereafter, Mr. Breeze concludes his arguments that the judge should 
"salvage this human being" by imposing "a mixed sentence with some incarceration 
combined with work release so that she can continue to support her young son who is 
still a minor." (R. at 69 1 9). The court reminded Mr. Breeze that the child was 
residing with the father, so Ms. Skidmore's support would be limited to child support 
payments only. 
Before the judge can rule, Mr. Breeze attempts to clarify a couple points 
by stating, 
Your Honor, I mean, this is a person who almost for her entire life has been 
basically a good human being and she's made a terrible mistake by getting 
involved in methamphetamine, as so many other people have. I just think, Your 
Honor, that she's salvageable, that she can be treated. That she wants to be 
treated. She wants to get back and be a good member of society. If that isn't 
the case, you could send her to prison at any time if she doesn't strictly adhere to 
everything that Your Honor orders. 
Given the status of her life, I think that a mixed sentence with some 
incarceration and some help from he system to make sure she doesn't get back 
on drugs could accomplish everything that needs to be done in this case. 
(R. at 69 1 9). Once the State had it's quick opportunity to rebut Mr. Breeze's 
arguments, the judge made his decision. The State conceded it had no doubt that Ms. 
Skidmore was basically a good person, but defended the claim that Ms. Skidmore was 
not sophisticated. Mr. Ward argued that since that arrest, Ms. Skidmore no longer 
leaves her trash can on the curbside. Also, the State emphasized the quantity to the 
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court. The State argued that the discovery of 19.8 grams of methamphetamine-"about 
eight grams short of an ounce "-along with the length of involvement and her age were 
the bases for sending Ms. Skidmore to prison. 
The trial court apparently sided with Ms. Skidmore and the court should 
have granted the requested reduction. (R. at 69 1 13). The judge stated identified that 
he struggled with this case, stating: 
On one hand I see a person that has very minimal involvement with the criminal 
justice system. I see a person that got relatively good family support . . . [i]n 
the presentence report you were very upfront with AP&P and with the police. 
(Id., at 1fl3). He then distinguished Ms. Skidmore's case from one previously 
sentenced that day, where the person only got probation. The judge indicated that Ms. 
Skidmore's quantity of meth (19.8 grams), the amount of money ($1,500), Ms. 
Skidmore's day planner, and her home's proximity to the elementary school were all 
factors to consider. The court explained to Ms. Skidmore that she reported to AP&P 
that she sold meth "because it was an easy way to make money." The Court 
understood that Ms. Skidmore "sold for over two-and-a-half years for an income to 
support [her] habit." He appreciated her honesty with AP&P, but was concerned about 
that being "a lot of sales over that point in time, a lot of distribution." (R. at 69 if 14). 
Then the judge offered his decision. The judge reasoned: 
I have looked at and weighed very carefully, is there any other thing I can look 
at besides prison? Yes, there are things I could look at. But you need to 
understand that my job is to weigh not only punishment to you, but also 
deterrence to you for the future. And I think that you're well on the way for 
9 
yourself as far as controlling this habit, but you need more than just walking 
away cold turkey. Then there is also general deterrence which needs to be 
looked at as far as not allowing distribution of methamphetamine in this 
community. 
Based upon that I am going to follow-Mr. Breeze has made an excellent, 
eloquent argument, but I want you to understand my decision here today is based 
after a lot of deliberation, trying to figure out what's best for you and what's 
best for this community. I am going to follow the recommendation. I am 
sentencing you to five years to life in the Utah State prison. 
Id., at ft 14-15. The trial court denied the motion. The judge accepted both Mr. 
Breeze's points and the State's points. However, rather than reducing the sentence and 
then sentencing Ms. Skidmore to one to fifteen years in prison he refused the reduction 
and sent her to prison for five years to life. 
But that's not all the judge ordered. The judge then informed Ms. 
Skidmore what he was going to do for her. Judge Willmore stated: 
Now, let me tell you what I'm going to do. I'm going to write a letter to the 
parole board and I'm going to point out to them certain things as far as what has 
been presented here today and in the presentence report. I'm going to encourage 
them to look at various programs that may be available as far as an early release 
into a halfway house, a treatment center, that type of thing. 
I will do that because I think, based upon the fact that you were 
cooperative, you do have family support; but I just cannot allow this to continue 
in this community. The one way I can stop it—I don't know if I'll ever be able to 
stop it. I don't know if we can ever stop the flow of this terrible drug, but I'll 
do what I can. One way is to-the message needs to be sent that it won't happen. 
It won't be allowed. 
So you are sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State Prison. I will 
write that letter within the next week to the parole board. I'll send a copy to 
Mr. Breeze to get a copy to you. 
{Id., at 1 15). At that point the court was asked again about a reduction and the court 
denied the same. (Id., at \ 16). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In this matter, Ms. Skidmore was treated unfairly by both her counsel and 
the trial court. Ms. Skidmore was talked into changing her plea to guilty rather than 
taking the case to a jury. The result of that decision was prejudicial. Ms. Skidmore 
was sent to prison. When Ms. Skidmore changed her plea to a first degree felony as 
charged even Judge Willmore was surprised. Mr. Breeze offered nothing to the trial 
court as explanation as to why Ms. Skidmore was entering such a plea. At that time, 
Mr. Breeze should have sought a reduction of the offense by agreement and ran it past 
the trial court. Nothing like that was attempted. 
Then at the time of sentencing, Mr. Breeze failed to argue points 
beneficial for Ms. Skidmore. Mr. Breeze should have addressed the points about how 
Ms. Skidmore had voluntarily entered a guilty plea, that she is presently attending 
counseling successfully, that she has fully disclosed to the PSI investigator, and that she 
is amenable to supervision. Instead he argued a prosecutorial argument about how 
dangerous methamphetamine has become to society. 
Ultimately, the judge imposed a sentence that was imposed in an illegal 
manner. It is his responsibility to rule on a 402 Motion he cannot not make the 
necessary findings and then defer the matter to the parole board. Nevertheless, he 
never forwarded the recommendations, which are inherently a part of the sentence in 
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the bifurcated sentencing scheme in Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
MS. SKIDMORE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY 
DENIED DUE PROCESS WHICH RESULTED IN A 
SENTENCING THAT WAS INHERENTLY UNFAIR. 
In State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the Court of Appeals stated the 
standard for review that this Court should also follow: 
This court '"does not disturb a sentence unless it exceeds that prescribed by law 
or unless the trial court has abused its discretion.'" State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 
188, 192 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986)). 
"An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing 
were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive' sentence." 
791 P.2d at 192-93 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
Id. In this matter, Ms. Skidmore concedes that on it's face the sentence is a lawful 
sentence. Meanwhile, bear in mind that Ms. Skidmore's appeal is premised upon her 
claim that the sentencing was inherently unfair. 
At the end of the sentencing, Ms. Skidmore was sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison. This commitment included recommendations by this Court regarding 
final sentencing. In the Utah sentencing scheme, the trial court orders an indeterminate 
term of incarceration and then the Board of Pardons determines the actual sentence to 
be served. Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In this matter, Judge Willmore denied the Defendant's Motion to reduce 
the offense from a First Degree Felony to a Second Degree Felony sentence. The 
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indeterminate terms of punishment are five to life in prison and one to fifteen, 
respectively. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1953, as amended). The motion was filed 
due to the mitigating circumstances existing in this case, and because under those 
mitigating circumstances, it was perceived to be unduly harsh to sentence the Ms. 
Skidmore to minimum of five years to a maximum of life in prison. 
Section 76-3-402 of the Utah Code provides when the court may reduce 
the level of offense. It provides in pertinent part: 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being 
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant to 
an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower 
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2000). 
In this matter, it appears as though the court made the necessary findings 
to warrant a reduction. The reduction was denied due to the deterrent effect the court 
wished to convey to other potential offenders. It appears as though the court wished 
accomplish both requests, to wit: send a message to methamphetamine users and 
distributors, and to provide Ms. Skidmore with the treatment that she was seeking. 
The court was clear that wanted the parole board to consider early release to a halfway 
house or a treatment center. (R. at 69 \ 15). However, he wasn't going to be the one 
to be responsible for the early release he was concerned with sending his deterrence 
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message. (R. at 69 1 14-15). 
Rather than granting the reduction to impose the lesser indeterminate 
sentence of one year to fifffteen years, the Court deferred e decision to the Board of 
Pardons and stated that it would forward a letter within that next week offering 
recommendations to the Board in light of the mitigating factors it was aware of during 
the sentencing process. Recommendations to the Board are permissible and within the 
discretion of the trial court. State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
However, the Board is not bound by any of the recommendations. Id. 
However, it appears as the this Court's decision was mindful of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-9 (1953, as amended). Section 77-27-9(1) provides: 
(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole may pardon or parole and offender or 
commute or terminate the sentence of any offender committed to a penal or 
correctional facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections for a 
felony or class A misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (2). 
(b) The board may not release any offender before the minimum term has been 
served unless the board finds mitigating circumstances which justify the release 
and unless the board has granted a full hearing, in open session . . . . 
Id. In this matter, it appears that the Board failed to receive the Judge's 
recommendations as instructed to the defendant at the time of the sentencing. See, 
letter to the Board of Pardons (dated April 3, 2001), attached as Addendum B. 
This failure caused the Board to set an Original Hearing for January 2003 
because it appears the Board was not fully apprized of or mindful of Judge Willmore's 
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intentions to recommend an early release. Had the Court entered written findings with 
it's final order, the Court would have fully apprized the Board of his sentencing 
conditions. 
This failure to provide the Board with all the mitigating factors in this 
matter has deprived Ms. Skidmore of due process of law. "The demands of due 
process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure 
appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." Rowlings, (quoting Wis combe 
v. Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Rupp v. Grantsville 
City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)); accord State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 
(Utah App. 1993); Holm v. SmilowitzMO P.2d 157, 164 (Utah App. 1992). 
It is clear that in this case, the defendant has been incidentally deprived of 
due process in her sentencing under Utah's sentencing scheme. In Utah, the duties in 
sentencing are shared by the trial court and the Board of Pardon. Labrum v. Utah Bd. of 
•Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993).2 Somewhere between the trial court and the board 
the critical piece of information that Ms. Skidmore relied upon to ensssure a fair and just 
mtence never reached the Board. 
Inasmuch as there has been such an egregious error in this matter, Ms. 
Skidmore seeks to correct the injustice on appeal. The trial court was within its 
2
 "[T]he trial judge has no discretion in fixing the term of imprisonment. He or she 
simply imposes the statutorily prescribed range of years, and the Board of Pardons 
determines exactly how long the prisoner is to be confined." Id. 
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discretion to impose an indeterminate term of incarceration at the prison for five years 
to life for a conviction of a First Degree Felony. However, on appeal, Ms. Skidmore 
would like to bring to the attention of this Court that Ms. Skidmore's sentence was 
inherently unfair for the following reasons: 
(1) Section 76-3-402 is a function directed to the court to perform, not the 
board. It cannot be delegated to the board as a function to carry out. 
(2) Ms. Skidmore's conviction of a First Degree Felony was due to the 
fact that she resided within a 1000' to a school. Had she resided 
elsewhere it is probable that her conviction would have only been for a 
Second Degree Felony to begin with.3 
(3) The amounts Ms. Skidmore admitted to consuming Vi to 3/4 grams of 
methamphetamine per day. Any sells was only to support her obvious 
addiction. The amount officers took from Ms. Skidmore's possession was 
only 19.8 grams total-allegedly under the circumstances a quantity for 
personal use. 
(4) She was not found operating a clandestine lab nor did officers seize 
precursors from her home. 
At any rate, none of these factors were presented to the judge. Absent the 
letter from the judge addressing his findings regarding these and other mitigating 
factors, the board was not in the position to honor the recommendations promised to be 
suuubmitted to the board following at next week on Ms. Skidmore's behalf. Moreover, 
the board was not presented anything on Ms. Skidmore's behalf: to wit (1) not the 
3
 Note: the legislative intent of an enhancement for being within 1000f of a school is 
to prevent drugs from being pushed on students in schools. In this matter, there are no 
allegations directly related to such conduct. 
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motion, (2) not the arguments of Mr. Breeze, (3) not the letter from the judge, and (4) 
not the transcript of the sentencing hearing. None of these things. In essence, Ms. 
Skidmore is still awaiting a decision from Judge Willmore on her motion. Moreover, 
she is still awaiting a fair and just sentence and a fair and just commitment that is not 
unduly harsh. 
Under this light, it becomes clear that Ms. Skidmore's sentence was 
inherently unfair and Judge Willmore's ruling oi*the Defendant's Motion was an abuse 
the motion, making it a part of the record to be provided to the parole board along with 
preserving Ms. Skidmore's right of appeal on the motion's outcome.4 Moreover, 
absent the letter from the file it is clear that the judge failed to follow through with 
what he promised her-of what he would do for Ms. Skidmore. These failures 
substantial prejudiced Ms. Skidmore, leaving her to serve a five to life term of 
incarceration without any recommendation for early release. Such a commitment is 
unduly harsh under the circumstances. 
POINT II. 
ROBERT BREEZE PROVIDED MS. SKIDMORE 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
4
 This issue will be addressed further in the ineffective counsel issue below. 
Apparently, Mr. Breeze never followed up with the court, the Board of Pardons, or Ms. 
..-B idmore to find out if the judge followed through with his promise to send a letter on Ms. 
idmore 5s behalf. 
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In State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the Court of 
Appeals restated the standard for review that this Court should also follow: 
Marvin's first claim is that Caine performed an inadequate investigation before 
advising him to plead guilty, thereby rendering his representation ineffective. In 
determining whether Marvin's counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we apply the two-pronged 
test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 
104 S. Cttt. 2052 (1984). , 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 
1996); Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995); Parsons v. Barnes, 
871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 130 L. Ed. 2d 344, 115 
S. Ct. 431 (1994). That test has been stated by this court as follows: "To 
prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.'" Parsons, 871 P.2d at 521 
(quoting Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)). With regard to the 
application of this test, there are two important subsidiary principles. First, we 
"'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance.'" 871 P.2d at 524 {quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689). Second, because a defendant has the burden of meeting both parts 
of the Strickland test, it is unnecessary for this court to apply both parts where 
our inquiry reveals that one of its parts is not satisfied. See id. 
Id. In this matter, Ms. Skidmore can successfully meet the Strickland Test. Firstly, 
Mr. Breeze failed at all points to represent Ms. Skidmore in an advocate capacity. Not 
once at any of the three hearings did Mr. Breeze challenge the claims raised against 
Ms. Skidmore. During the Preliminary Hearing, the defendant waived the prelim. 
During the pretrial, Mr. Breeze offered nothing to the judge why Ms. Skidmore would 
be pleading Guilty. When Mr. Breeze informed the court that the State made Ms. 
Skidmore an offer and she was willing to accept it, the court was shocked to hear that 
she would be pleading Guilty to the offense as charged. The Court exclaimed, "To a 
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first degree felony." (R. at 70 1f 2). Then at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Breeze spent 
a great deal of time talking about the history of the drug and emphasized how it had 
become a scourge on society. Moreover, he spent a great deal of time distinguishing 
raeth from other types of drugs-even of the same schedule- by repeatedly 
characterizing methamphetamine as an "evil, insidious, diabolical, Satanic drug," by 
languishing on its destructive effects on the community, and by referring to Ms. 
Skidmore as a human being rather than presenting her more softly before the court. 
Moreover, Robert Breeze should have taken recommendations of the State 
and ran them past the judge to determine whether the judge would follooow any 
recommendatns. This act is pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Robert Breeze did not follow Rule 11 in that capacity leaving the outcome 
of the case completely unknown to Ms. Skidmore and completely unpredictable. 
Surely, Mr. Breeze didn't give up once Ms. Skidmore plead Guilty. However, his 
filing of the Defendant's Motion was likewise below the standards of the profession. 
The motion failed to address the types of mitigating factors that the court would 
consider to be unduly harsh under 76-3-402 of the Utah Code. The Defendant's 
Motion stated: 
1. Defendant Corinne Skidmore has not had any involvement in the criminal 
justice system prior to this case. 
2. Defendant Corrine Skidmore has undertaken, successfully thus far, to 
terminate her use and addiction to methamphetamine. Defendant has been 
undergoing regular urinalysis and substance abuse counseling since shortly after 
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her arrest in this matter. 
3. Defendant has managed to raise children to adulthood who appear to be 
productive members of society despite being, at times, a single parent without 
advanced education or training. 
4. Defendant acknowledges the destruction that her addiction to and involvement 
with methamphetamine has wrought upon herself and others and is remorseful 
about her criminal conduct. 
Id. It is clear by reading these four paragraph that Mr. Breeze apparently failed to 
conduct a reasonable investigation into facts relevant to a client, because in only two 
statements does he even addresses mitigating factors that could be beneficial to a client. 
Within paragraph 2, Mr. Breeze alludes to Ms. Skidmore's treatment for her probable 
substance dependence disorder with the Bear River Health Department Substance 
Abuse Program that she volunteered for shortly after her March 2000 arrest. 
Within paragraph 4, Mr. Breeze indicates that Ms. Skidmore was sorry 
for her addiction and possible destruction she caused to others. Responsibility is 
different from accountability. In this matter, Mr. Breeze fails to identify either and a 
bald claim of remorse in not enough to show that punishment would be unduly harsh 
under the circumstances for the conduct he had his client assume at the Pretrial. 
In contrast, paragraph 1 demonstrated to be an aggravating factor. 
During the sentencing, it was discovered to be untrue. Judge Willmore himself pointed 
out that actually, Ms. Skidmore previously had two prior DUIs. Also, in paragraph 3, 
Ms. Skidmore's ability to successful parent to adult children prior to her drug addiction 
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is irrelevant to support the notion that her sentence as a first degree felony would be 
unduly harsh. 
Meanwhile, what any effective counsel would have raised an emphasized 
is the following: 
(1) Ms. Skidmore's Guilty plea was willing to cooperate with the State in 
resolving the matter. 
(2) Ms. Skidmore's Guilty plea was willing to cooperative with the 
presentence investigator providing full disclosure. 
(3) The physical evidence discovered in her garbage can suggested only 
personal consumption rather than distribution. 
(4) The two confidential informants testimony was suspect. 
(5) Prior to her incarceration, Ms. Skidmore was the custodial parent of her 
young son-deprivation of custody was already some punishment. 
(6) Addiction is a disease and with regular treatment and proper supervision 
can be avoided. 
(7) Ms. Skidmore's residence was within 1000' of a school, but her conduct 
was truly unrelated to the proximity to the school. 
Mr. Breeze's deficient professional did not end there however. In 
addition, Mr. Breeze failed to follow up the letter promised to him by the judge. The 
letter should have reached him no later than the first week of August, 2000. He never 
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got the letter and he never followed up with the letter. This failure resulted in Ms. 
Skidmore not having her determinate sentence determined with the Judge's 
recommendation considered. To date, the letter still has not been drafted. 
Through these failures, Ms. Skidmore has been prejudiced by the 
representation provided her by Mr. Breeze. The sentence and term of commitment is 
unduly harsh. She should have been released to a halfway house or a treatment 
program. But for the errors of counsel, she remains incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison.5 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Skidmore has been unjustly treated in this matter. This Court should 
either vacate the sentence or reverse the conviction, and remand this case for further 
proceeding with instructions by the Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of June, 2001. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
5
 Through new counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, not only has a letter of reconsideration 
been sent to the Board but a Petition for Post-Conviction Motion for Clarification and to 
Correct Sentence to the trial court. Action by the trial court is still pending on the petition 
even though a hearing has been conducted and the court has admitted it's mistake. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 11th day of June, 2001,1 
served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the 
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
J. Frederic Voros 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
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ADDENDUM A 
301 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 76-3-203 
criminal judgment account receivable as a civil judgment 
and transfer the responsibility for collecting the criminal 
judgment account receivable to the Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
(9) (a) When a fine, forfeiture, surcharge, cost permitted by 
statute, fee, or an order of restitution is imposed on a 
corporation or unincorporated association, the person 
authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the 
corporation or association shall pay the obligation from 
those assets. 
(b) Failure to pay the obligation may be held to be 
contempt under Subsection (3). 
(10) The prosecuting attorney may collect restitution in 
behalf of a victim. 1909 
76-3-201.2. Civil act ion by v ict im for damages . 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not 
limit or impair the right of a person injured by a defendant's 
criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the 
defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has 
paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part or 
Section 77-18-1, may not be introduced in any civil action 
arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the 
restitution. However, the court shall credit any restitution 
paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in 
favor of the victim in the civil action. 
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the 
issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a 
victim, that issue is conclusively determined as to the defen-
dant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action. 1990 
76-3-201.3. Repealed. 1996 
76-3-202. Paroled persons — Termination ,or discharge 
from s e n t e n c e — Time served on parole — 
Discret ion of Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, every 
person committed to the state prison to serve an indetermi-
nate term and later released on parole shall, upon completion 
of three years on parole outside of confinement and without 
violation, be terminated from his sentence unless the person is 
earlier terminated by the Board of Pardons and Parole. Any 
person who violates the terms of his parole, while serving 
parole, shall at the discretion of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole be recommitted to prison to serve the portion of the 
balance of his term as determined by the Board of Pardons and 
Parole, but not to exceed the maximum term., 
(2) Every person convicted of a second degree felony
 7for 
violating Section 76-5-404 or 76-5-404.1, or attempting <;o 
violate any of those sections, upon completion' of ten years 
parole outside of confinement and without violation, shall be 
terminated from his sentence unless the ^person is earlier 
terminated by the Board of Pardons and Parole. Any person 
who violates the terms of his parole, while serving parole, 
shall at the discretion of the Board of Pardons and Parole be 
recommitted to prison to serve the portion of the balance of his 
term as determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole, but 
not to exceed the maximum term. 
(3) Every person convicted of a first degree felony for 
violating Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(l)(bXv), 
Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1,76-S-402.2,76-5-402.3,76-5-403, 
76-5-403.1, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405, or attempting to violate 
any of those sections, shall complete a term of lifetime parole 
outside of confinement and without violation unless the per-
son is earlier terminated by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
Any person who violates the terms of his parole, while serving 
parole, shall at the discretion of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole be recommitted to prison to serve the portion of the 
balance of his term as determined by the Board of Pardons and 
Parole, but not to exceed the maximum term. 
(4) In order for a parolee convicted on or after May 5,1997, 
to be eligible for early termination from parole, the parolee 
must provide: 
(a) evidence to the Board of Pardons and Parole that 
the parolee has completed high school classwork and has 
obtained a high school graduation diploma, a GED certifi-
cate, or a vocational certificate; or 
(b) documentation of the inability to obtain one of the 
items listed in Subsection (a) because of: 
(i) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(ii) other justified cause. 
(5) Any person paroled following a former parole revocation 
may not be discharged from his sentence until either: 
(a) he has served three years or ten years as provided 
in Subsection (2) on parole outside of confinement and 
without violation, or in the case of a person convicted of a 
first degree felony violation of Section 76-5-301.1, Subsec-
tion 76-5-302(l)(bXv), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-
402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404.1, or 
76-5-405, or attempting to violate any of those sections, 
lifetime parole outside of confinement and without viola-
tion; 
(b) his maximum sentence has expired; or 
(c) the Board of Pardons and Parole so orders. 
(6) (a) All time,served on parole, outside of confinement 
and without violation constitutes service of the total 
sentence but does not preclude the requirement of serving 
a three-year, ten-year, or lifetime parole term, as the case 
may be, outside of confinement and without violation. 
(b) Any time a person spends outside of confinement 
after commission of a parole violation does not constitute 
service of the total sentence unless the person is exoner-
ate^ at a hearing to revoke the parole. 
(c) Any time spent in confinement awaiting a hearing 
before the Board of Pardons and Parole or a decision by 
the board concerning revocation of parole constitutes 
service of the sentence. In the case of exoneration by the 
board, the time spent shall be included in computing the 
total parole term. 
(7) When any parolee without authority from the Board of 
Pardons and Parole absents himself from the state or avoids or 
evades parole supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or 
evasion tolls the parole period. 
(8) While on parole, time spent in confinement outside the 
state may not be credited toward the service of any Utah 
sentence. Time in confinement outside the state for a convic-
tion obtained in another jurisdiction shall toll the expiration of 
the Utah sentence. 
(9) This section does not preclude the Board of Pardons and 
Parole from paroling or discharging an inmate at any time 
within the discretion of the Board of Pardons and Parole 
unless otherwise specifically provided by law. 
(10) The parolee may petition the Board of Pardons and 
Parole for termination of lifetime parole as provided by 
Section 76-3-202 in the case of a person convicted of a first 
degree felony violation Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-
302(l)(bXv), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-
402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405, or at-
tempting to violate any of those sections. 1998 
76-3-203. Felony convic t ion — Indeterminate term of 
imprisonment — Increase of s en tence if dan-
gerous weapon used. 
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the 
same definition as in Section 76-1-601. 
(2) A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term 
of not less than five years, unless otherwise specifically 
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provided by law, and which may be for life, but if the trier 
of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony, the court shall sentence the person convicted for a 
term of not less than six years, and which may be for life. 
(b) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a 
term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years, but 
if the tner of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
dangerous weapon was used in the commission or further-
ance of the felony, the court shall sentence the person 
convicted for a term of not less than two years nor more 
than 15 years; and the court may sentence the person 
convicted for a term of not less than two years nor more 
than 20 years. 
(c) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term 
not to exceed five years, but if the trier of fact finds beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in 
the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court 
shall sentence the person convicted for a term of not less 
than one year nor more than five years; and the court may 
sentence the person convicted for a term of not less than 
one year nor more than ten years. 
(d) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt 
that any person who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon 
was used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony 
and is subsequently convicted of another felony when a 
dangerous weapon was used in the commission of or 
furtherance of the felony shall, in addition to any other 
sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate 
term to be not less than five nor more than ten years to 
run consecutively and not concurrently. 2000 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed in concert with two or 
more persons — Notice — Enhanced penal-
ties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsec-
tion (4) is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as 
provided in Subsection (3) if the trier of fact finds beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with 
two or more persons. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in 
this section means the defendant was aided or encouraged 
by at least two other persons in committing the offense 
and was aware that he was so aided or encouraged, and 
each of the other persons: 
(\) was physically present; or 
(n) participated as a party to any offense listed in 
Subsection (4). 
(c) For purposes of Subsection (lXb)(ii): 
d) other persons participating as parties need not 
have the intent to engage in the same offense or 
degree of offense as the defendant; and 
(11) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would 
cause him to be a party if he were an adult. 
(2) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment 
is returned, shall cause to be subscribed upon the information 
or indictment notice that the defendant is subject to the 
enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
(3) The enhanced penalty for a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony; 
(c) third degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; 
(e) first degree felony is an enhanced minimum term of 
nine years in prison; and 
(f) capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed is 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 
37b, or 37c, regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 
5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chap-
ter 5, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 
76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses 
under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Part 4; 
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, 
except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 
76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-
513, 76-6-514,76-6-516,76-6-517,76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations 
under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 3, except Sections 76-8-
302,76-8-303,76-8-304,76-8-307,76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of 
Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding 
as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and perfor-
mances offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus 
Passenger Safety Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 1 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-
1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, 
Money Laundering and Currency Transaction Reporting 
Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 
76-10-2002. 
(5) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under 
this section that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to 
have acted in concert are not identified, apprehended, 
charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged 
with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 2000 
76-3-203.2. Definitions — Use of dangerous weapon in 
offenses committed on or about school pre-
mises — Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) As used in this section and Section 76-10-505.5, "on 
or about school premises" means any of the following: 
(i) in a public or private elementary, secondary, or 
on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
siiiim nr ntVipr qtmcture or grounds which are, at the 
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76-3-302. F ines of corporations, associations, partner-
ships, or government instrumental i t ies . 
A corporation, association, partnership, or governmental 
instrumentality shall pay a fine for an offense defined in this 
code for which no special corporate fine is specified. The fine 
shall not exceed: 
(1) $20,000 for a felony conviction; 
(2) $10,000 for a class A misdemeanor conviction; 
(3) $5,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction; and 
(4) $1,000 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or for 
an infraction conviction. 1995 
76-3-303. Additional sanctions against corporation or 
associat ion — Advertising of convict ion — 
Disqualification of officer. 
(1) When a corporation or association is convicted of an 
offense, the court may, in addition to or in lieu of imposing 
other authorized sanctions, require the corporation or associa-
tion to give appropriate publicity ofthe conviction by notice to 
the class or classes of persons or section of the public inter-
ested in or affected by the conviction, by advertising in 
designated areas, or by designated media or otherwise. 
(2) When an executive or high managerial officer of a 
corporation or association is convicted of an offense committed 
in furtherance of the affairs of the corporation or association, 
the court may include in the sentence an order disqualifying 
him from exercising similar functions in the same or other 
corporations or associations for a period of not exceeding five 
years if it finds the scope or willfulness of his illegal actions 
make it dangerous or inadvisable for such functions to be 
entrusted to him. 1973 
PART 4 
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON 
SENTENCES 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecut ive sentences — 
Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been ad-
judged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses 
run consecutively if the later offense is committed while the 
defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds 
and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be 
inappropriate. 
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state 
whether the sentences shall run consecutively or concurrently, 
and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason to believe 
that the later offense occurred while the person was impris-
oned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall 
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the 
request, the court shall enter an amended order of commit-
ment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively 
or concurrently. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 
76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggre-
gate maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 
30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsec-
tion (6Xb). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6Xa) does not 
apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence 
of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional 
offense based on conduct which occurs after his initial 
sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defen-
dant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one 
offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more 
offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition 
of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state 
other than the present sentencing court or by a court of 
another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct 
giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his 
initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6Xa) applies, deter-
mining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in 
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole 
shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for 
a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year 
limitation, the maximum sentence is considered to be 30 
years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, 
the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate ofthe 
validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to 
run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently 
being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the greater 
and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences 
are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence 
with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be 
served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the 
number or length of individual consecutive sentences that 
may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the author-
ity of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor 
cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced 
and committed to a secure correctional facility as defined in 
Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where 
the person is located. 1999 
76-3-402. Convict ion of l ower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circum-
stances ofthe offense of which the defendant was found guilty 
and to the history and character ofthe defendant, concludes it 
would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for 
that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence 
the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that 
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically provided 
by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree 
of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction 
is considered to be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A 
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within the 
limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the 
defendant is placed on probation, whether committed 
to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
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(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged with-
out violating his probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the pros-
ecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by either 
party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice 
that the conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this 
section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or 
on the court record that the offense may be reduced two 
degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any 
person from obtaining or being granted an expungement of his 
record as provided by law. 1991 
76-3-403. Credit for good behavior against jail sen-
tence for misdemeanors and certain felonies. 
In any commitment for incarceration in a county jail or 
detention facility, other than the Utah State Prison, the 
custodial authority may in its discretion and upon good 
behavior of the inmate allow up to ten days credit against the 
sentence to be served for every 30 days served or up to two 
days credit for every ten days served when the period to be 
served is less than 30 days if: 
(1) the incarceration is for a misdemeanor offense, and 
the sentencing judge has not entered an order to the 
contrary; or 
(2) the incarceration is part of a probation agreement 
for a felony offense, and the sentencing district judge has 
not entered an order to the contrary. 1998 
76-3-403.5. Work release from county jail or de tent ion 
facility. 
When an inmate is committed for incarceration in a county 
jail or in a detention facility, the custodial authority may in its 
discretion allow the inmate to work outside of the jail or 
facility as part of a jail or facility supervised work detail if the 
inmate's incarceration: 
(1) is for a misdemeanor offense, and the sentencing 
judge has not entered an order to the contrary; 
(2) is part of a probation agreement for a felony offense, 
and the sentencing district judge has not entered an order 
to the contrary; or 
(3) is in a county facility pursuant to a contract with 
the Department of Corrections. 2000 
76-3-404. Presentence investigation and diagnostic 
evaluation — Commitment of defendant — 
Sentencing procedure. 
(1) (a) (i) In felony cases where the court is of the opinion 
imprisonment may be appropriate but desires more 
detailed information as a basis for determining the 
sentence to be imposed than has been provided by the 
presentence report, the court may in its discretion 
commit a convicted defendant to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for a diagnostic evalua-
tion for a period not exceeding 90 days. 
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall conduct a 
complete study and evaluation of the defendant dur-
ing that time, inquiring into matters including: 
(A) the defendant's previous delinquency or 
criminal experience; 
(B) his social background; 
(C) his capabilities; 
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical 
health; and 
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or 
by the expiration of additional commitment t ime the 
court may grant, not exceeding a further period of 90 
days, the defendant shall be returned to the'court for 
sentencing and the court, prosecutor, and the defen-
dant or his attorney shall be provided with a writ ten 
diagnostic evaluation report of results of the study, 
including any recommendations the Department of 
Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will 
be helpful to a proper resolution of the case. 
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by 
the court is supplemental to and becomes a par t of the 
presentence investigation report. 
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation re-
port and recommendations, the court shall proceed to 
sentence a defendant in accordance with the sentenc-
ing alternatives provided under Section 76-3-201. 
(2) Any commitment for presentence investigation under 
this section does not constitute a commitment to prison. 
However, any person who is committed to prison following 
proceedings under this section shall be given credit against his 
sentence for the time spent in confinement for a presentence 
investigation report. 1991 
76-3-405. Limitat ion on s e n t e n c e w h e r e convict ion o r 
prior sentence set aside. 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on 
direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose 
a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense 
based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior 
sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously 
satisfied. 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were 
not known to the court at the time of the original sen-
tence, and the court affirmatively places on the record the 
facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence; 
or 
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the 
prosecution and later successfully moves to invalidate his 
conviction, in which case the defendant and the prosecu-
tion stand in the same position as though the plea 
bargain, conviction, and sentence had never occurred. 
1997 
76-3-406. Crimes for which probation, suspension of 
sentence, lower category of offense, or hospi-
talization shall not be granted. 
Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-201 and 77-18-1 and Title 
77, Chapter 16, except as provided in Section 76-5-406.5, 
probation shall not be granted, the execution or imposition of 
sentence shall not be suspended, the court shall not enter a 
judgment for a lower category of offense, and hospitalization 
shall not be ordered, the effect of which would in any way 
shorten the prison sentence for any person who commits a 
capital felony or a first degree felony involving: 
(1) Section 76-5-202, aggravated murder; 
(2) Section 76-5-203, murder; 
(3) Section 76-5-301.1, child kidnaping; 
(4) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(5) Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child; 
(6) Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child; 
(7) Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child; 
(8) Subsections 76-5-404.1(3) and (4), aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child; 
(9) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; or 
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when the board dispenses with a record in a particular 
hear ing or a portion of the proceedings. 
(2) When the hearing involves the commutation of a death 
sentence, a certified shorthand reporter, in addition to me-
chanical means, shall record all proceedings except when the 
board dispenses with a record for the purpose of deliberations 
in executive session. The compensation of the reporter shall be 
determined by the board. The reporter shall immediately file 
with the board the original record and when requested shall 
with reasonable diligence furnish a transcription or copy of 
the record upon payment of reasonable fees as determined by 
the board. 
(3) When the party in interest affirms by affidavit tha t he is 
unable to pay for a transcript or copy of the record which is 
necessary for further proceedings available to him, and tha t 
affidavit is not refuted, the board may order the reporter to 
furnish to the party in interest a transcript, or a copy of the 
record, or so much of it as is reasonably applicable to any 
further proceedings, or a copy of the recording, at the expense 
of the state, to the party in interest. 1994 
77-27-9. P a r o l e p roceed ings . 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole may pardon or 
parole any offender or commute or terminate the sentence 
of any offender committed to a penal or correctional 
facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Cor-
rections for a felony or class A misdemeanor except as 
provided in Subsection (2). 
(b) The board may not release any offender before the 
minimum term has been served unless the board finds 
mitigating circumstances which justify the release and 
unless the board has granted a full hearing, in open 
session, after previous notice of the time and place of the 
hearing, and recorded the proceedings and decisions of 
the board. 
(c) The board may not pardon or parole any offender or 
commute or terminate the sentence of any offender unless 
the board has granted a full hearing, in open session, after 
previous notice of the time and place of the hearing, and 
recorded the proceedings and decisions of the board. 
(d) The release of an offender shall be a t the initiative 
of the board, which shall consider each case as the 
offender becomes eligible. However, a prisoner may sub-
mit his own application, subject to the rules of the board 
promulgated in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(2) (a) A person sentenced to prison prior to April 29,1996, 
for a first degree felony involving child kidnaping, a 
violation of Section 76-5-301.1; aggravated kidnaping, a 
violation of Section 76-5-302; rape of a child, a violation of 
Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a child, a violation of 
Section 76-5-402.3; sodomy upon a child, a violation of 
Section 76-5-403.1; aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a 
violation of Subsection 76-5-404.1(3); aggravated sexual 
assault , a violation of Section 76-5-405; or a prior offense 
as described in Section 76-3-407, may not be eligible for 
release on parole by the Board of Pardons and Parole until 
the offender has fully completed serving the minimum 
mandatory sentence imposed by the court. This subsec-
tion supersedes any other provision of law. 
(b) The board may not parole any offender or commute 
or terminate the sentence of any offender before the 
offender has served the minimum term for the offense, if 
the offender was sentenced prior to April 29,1996, and if: 
(i) the offender was convicted of forcible sexual 
abuse, forcible sodomy, rape, aggravated assault, kid-
naping, aggravated kidnaping, or aggravated sexual 
assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5; and 
(ii) the victim of the offense was under 18 years of 
age at the time the offense was committed. 
(c) For a crime committed on or after April 29,1996, the 
board may parole any offender under Subsections (2)(b)(i) 
and (ii) for lifetime parole as provided in Section 77-27-9. 
(d) The board may not pardon or parole any offender or 
commute or terminate the sentence of any offender who is 
sentenced to life in prison without parole except as 
provided in Subsection (6). 
(e) On or after April 27,1992, the board may commute 
a sentence of death only to a sentence of life in prison 
without parole. 
(f) The restrictions imposed in Subsections 77-27-
9(2)(d) and (e) apply to all cases that come before the 
Board of Pardons and Parole on or after April 27, 1992. 
(3) The board may issue subpoenas to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses and the production of evidence, to admin-
ister oaths, and to take testimony for the purpose of any 
investigation by the board or any of its members or by a 
designated hearing examiner in the performance of its duties. 
A person who willfully disobeys a properly served subpoena 
issued by the board is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(4) (a) The board may adopt rules consistent with law for 
its government, meetings and hearings, the conduct of 
proceedings before it, the parole and pardon of offenders, 
the commutation and termination of sentences, and the 
general conditions under which parole may be granted 
and revoked. 
(b) The rules shall ensure an adequate opportunity for 
victims to participate at hearings held under this chapter, 
as provided in Section 77-27-9.5. 
(c) The rules may allow the board to establish reason-
able and equitable time limits on the presentations by all 
participants in hearings held under this chapter. 
(5) The board does not provide counseling or therapy for 
victims as a part of their participation in any hearing under 
this chapter. 
(6) The board may parole a person sentenced to life in 
prison without parole if the board finds by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the person is permanently incapable of being 
a threat to the safety of society. 1996 
77-27-9.5. Vict im m a y a t t e n d h e a r i n g s . 
(1) As used in this section, "hearing" means a hearing for a 
parole grant or revocation, or a rehearing of either of these if 
the offender is present. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), when a 
hearing is held regarding any offense committed by the 
defendant that involved the victim, the victim may attend 
the hearing to present his views concerning the decisions 
to be made regarding the defendant. 
(b) (i) The victim may not attend a redetermination or 
special attention hearing, if the offender is not 
present. 
(ii) At that redetermination or special attention 
hearing, the board shall give consideration to any 
presentation previously given by the victim regarding 
that offender. 
(3) (a) The notice of the hearing shall be timely sent to the 
victim at his most recent address of record with the board. 
(b) The notice shall include: 
(i) the date, t ime, and location of the hearing; 
(ii) a clear s tatement of the reason for the hearing, 
including all offenses involved; 
(iii) the s tatutes and rules applicable to the vic-
tim's participation in the hearing; 
(iv) the address and telephone number of an office 
or person the victim may contact for further explana-
tion of the procedure regarding victim participation 
in the hearing; and 
(v) specific information about how, when, and 
where the victim may obtain the results of the hear-
ing. 
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April 3, 2001 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS 
Attn: Kent Jones 
448 East 6400 South, Suite 300 (801) 261-6481 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Re: Corinne Skidmore. USP #30604 
Request for New Original Hearing Date 
Dear Board Members: 
This letter is a request for a New Original Hearing. I have been retained by Ms. Skidmore to 
take over as her attorney of record. Her former counsel was Robert Breeze. With this request 
I am enclosing a copy of the trial court's sentencing hearing transcript for your consideration. 
I would like the Board to reconsider it's January 2003 Original Hearing and schedule an 
expedited hearing. Pursuant to Rule 671-201-1, the Board will only consider information 
available to the court at the time of sentencing. It appears that the Board was missing critical 
information when it set its first Original Hearing for Ms. Skidmore. 
When my office called the Board today to investigate what all the Board considered in setting 
Ms. Skidmore's January 2003 Original Hearing date, it was brought to our attention that the 
Board was not in receipt of a copy of the sentencing hearing transcript nor did the Board have 
available Judge Willmore's letter instructing the Board "of certain things . . . that may 
encourage them to look at various programs that may be available as far as an early release 
into a halfway house, a treatment center," or some other appropriate alternative. (See 
transcript at page 15 K 5). It appears as though his commitment order was conditioned by the 
Court at the time of sentencing to include his letter recommend. 
It is unfortunate that this delay has occurred over these past several months. I was alarmed to 
find out that the Board was not in possession of these things when it considered its Original 
Hearing initially. In light of the circumstances, I am forwarding you a copy of the transcript, a 
copy of a news paper article, as well as this synopsis (letter request) of what I understand to be 
the Court's intent. It is my understanding that prior to sentencing, Robert Breeze, filed a 
motion seeking a 76-3-403 reduction of the offense from a First Degree to a Second Degree 
Felony. The motion complained that a First Degree commitment would be unduly harsh to 
Ms. Skidmore. Under the circumstances, I believe that a First Degree commitment was 
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unduly harsh and I feel that Judge Willmore made those findings at the time of sentencing. 
(Id., at 15). However, after stating these findings, the Judge deferred to the Board to render a 
decision regarding treatment, suggesting treatment over imprisonment. Some of the mitigating 
factors that were presented to the Judge at the time of sentencing are as follows: 
(A) She fully disclosed to the presentence investigator. (Id., at 7). 
(B) According to the PSI, Ms. Skidmore had a severe meth consumption problem at 
the time of the alleged offense (often time consuming more than "a half to one 
ounce per week"). (Transcript, at 14). 
(C) The alleged possession of meth was a quantity less than 19.8 grams (she 
disclosed to the PSI to consume weekly a half to an ounce a week-this level is 
within her personal use). 
(D) She never tested positive a single time during presentencing. (Id., at 5). 
(E) She was succeeding in treatment during presentencing. (Id., at 6.) 
(F) Her full disclosure was repeatedly used against her rather than to mitigate 
(showing responsibility and amenability for supervision). Otherwise, there 
appeared to be zero evidence of distribution. (Id.) 
(G) Upon review of sentencing transcript, it is clear that Ms. Skidmore was 
sentenced because of her PSI disclosures. No one ever addressed any evidence 
supporting the elements of the offense (with exception to the 19.8 grams of meth 
that was seized). During her sentencing, her disclosures were only relied on to 
convict her. 
Meanwhile, since I do not have a copy of Judge Willmore's letter either, I am forwarding a 
copy if this letter requesting a new Original Hearing to the First District Court. Hopefully 
upon receipt by the Court, the Clerk will resubmit a copy of Judge Willmore's letter to the 
Board for further consideration and to my office to assist her in further proceedings. 
Nevertheless, if I can be of further assistance, please call. Thank you for your time and 
consideration. And I look forward hearing from you shortly. 
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Sincerely, 
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C. 
D. Bruce Oliver 
DBOrjkj 
Enclosures 
cc: The Honorable Tom L. Willmore 
Corinne Skdmore 
Bruce G. Ward 
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